News & Insights

Tag: Information Access

  • Outside Information: One of the Keys to Empowering North Korean Citizens as Agents of Change

    Outside Information: One of the Keys to Empowering North Korean Citizens as Agents of Change

    The opacity of North Korean society—with outsiders having limited access to the country. North Korean citizens are often only seen as the victims—powerless and disconnected from the rest of the world. Because of this perception, decades of international efforts to engage and access the restrictive state have neglected to consider its people as a key partner in effecting change inside North Korea.

    However, evidence over the past two decades has shown that the North Korean people have survived poverty and repression by becoming more independent from the regime, claiming greater agency over their own lives. Recognizing the people are an integral part of the solution to security, human rights and humanitarian challenges in North Korea, the international community needs to do more than just stand on the side of North Korean citizens; it needs to empower them so that that they can play a key role in holding the regime accountable.

    https://www.38north.org/2023/06/outside-information-one-of-the-keys-to-empowering-north-korean-citizens-as-agents-of-change

  • Information Dissemination in North Korea: How People Trust and Share Information

    Information Dissemination in North Korea: How People Trust and Share Information

    Research report into how information is shared and disseminated in North Korean society. Types of information (news, videos, information), and the technology (USB, DVD, mobile, etc.) used to share that Technology, methodology and sources of information, and with whom information is likely to be shared, and where it is likely to be shared.

    Key takeaways are as follows:
    • North Korea’s information control strategy minimizes general social trust. Hence, strangers cannot be trusted, and supposedly neutral sites like outdoor spaces are dangerous for the acquisition of illicit content.

    • Friends and family are trusted sources and conduits of information dissemination. The state has seemingly not been able to co-opt and control family and friendship bonds to any where near the same extent as it has fomented distrust between neighbors and strangers.

    • Markets are less favored for foreign content acquisition than one’s own home or the homes of others, but the least favored place is general outdoor locations.

    • Information dissemination strategies that rely on markets and commercial activities must reckon with the state’s relentless drive to control all activity outside the home.

    • North Koreans are unlikely to share information with strangers, might share with a neighbor, and are likely to share with friends and family. If North Koreans acquire foreign information, they are highly likely to share it with friends and family (roughly 75% of the time).

    • With whom North Koreans share information is influenced by the source.

    • The North Korean state’s information control strategies appear to be adapted to the peculiarities of North Korean society. The North
    Korean state remains dominant at every level of North Korean society.

    https://scdenney.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/for-ngos_information-dissimination-in-north-korea_ward-and-denney_ned-2022.pdf

  • Project Reveal: New research into North Korea’s Digital Control System

    Project Reveal: New research into North Korea’s Digital Control System

    The availability of the Internet and smartphones has transformed societies around the world. Citizens now can access knowledge from around the globe, seek out independent news coverage and voice their opinion with little filter. While state controls exist to varying degrees in some countries, nowhere is the control as complete and restrictive as North Korea.

    While the smartphones available in Pyongyang are little different to those available in other countries, the installation of custom software, a closed communications network and constant monitoring, mean the device in North Korea is useful to consumers for little more than consumption of state-approved propaganda. However, for the state, smartphones constitute a potentially potent vector for remote surveillance at scale. To date, there is no evidence that metadata is being exploited at a large scale for surveillance purposes, but this is an area that must be monitored.

    Much of North Korea’s information control system is based on the same technologies that underpin the Internet and smartphones globally but rather than expanding access to knowledge, North Korean engineers have removed or modified features to block it.

    Research explores use of technology inside North Korea, issues with usage of that technology and methods dissemination. Also explores how North Koreans are getting around attempts to block information dissemination. The result is a cat-and-mouse game involving technology, cell-phones and other devices.

    https://www.lumen.global/reveal-report

  • North Korea’s War Against Outside Information and Culture

    North Korea’s War Against Outside Information and Culture

    In recent years, the North Korean government’s war against outside information and culture has intensified. At its core, this war stems from the government’s belief that outside information and culture, which fall under the umbrella of “non-socialist culture,” causes fissures in people’s loyalty toward the regime, particularly the young generation, and poses an existential threat to society’s status quo.

    https://www.38north.org/2023/05/north-koreas-war-against-outside-information-and-culture